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SPECIFICITY, BLIGHT AND TWO TIERS OF TIF: A PROPOSAL 
FOR REFORM OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
A recent urban development project in St. Louis’ north side generated 
tremendous legal and political controversy. Like many development projects in 
the area, it sought tax increment financing (TIF) as its core source of start-up 
funding. At stake was over $390 million in TIF funding, by far the most in 
Missouri history,1 for the 1,500-acre urban development widely held to be the 
only real hope to revitalize the long-stagnant north side.2 
The battle lines were drawn and played out in Missouri courts, as well as 
the local media. Proponents of the TIF, which included the City of St. Louis 
and local aldermen,3 maintained that the plan of developer Paul McKee and his 
“NorthSide Regeneration LLC” was the only viable hope of redirecting the 
area away from many decades of decline.4 Denying the TIF would mean 
denying a project that embodied the core legislative justification for TIF: urban 
renewal.5 They argued that such a massive project required flexibility to evolve 
and meet market demand, and that judicial oversight of a project already 
 
 1. Tim Logan, NorthSide TIF Back in Court This Week, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 
26, 2012, at A1, A4. 
 2. See, e.g., Editorial, Give NorthSide a Chance, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 21, 
2012, at A18 [hereinafter Give NorthSide a Chance] (“[McKee’s] working in a part of the city 
that began hollowing out in the 1950s. If it was going to spontaneously regenerate, it would have 
done so by now. And we don’t see a lot of other developers standing in line to do business 
there.”). 
 3. See Missouri ex rel. Smith v. TIF Comm’rs (Smith I), No. 0922-CC09379, 2010 WL 
7352897, at *2–3 (Mo. 22d Cir. July 2, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Smith v. St. Louis, No. ED95733, 
2012 WL 2317240 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. June 19, 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 395 S.W.3d 
20, 26 (Mo. 2013) (“Defendants-respondents included the City of St. Louis, the members of the 
City’s Tax Increment Financing Commission, the Mayor, and all members of the Board of 
Aldermen, as well as NorthSide Regeneration, LLC, the proponent of the NorthSide 
Redevelopment Plan.” Plaintiffs-petitioners included Bonzella Smith, a resident in the area to be 
affected by the proposed TIF.). 
 4. Give NorthSide a Chance, supra note 2. 
 5. See, e.g., Editorial, Gentrification by TIF, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 2012, at 
A14 [hereinafter Gentrification by TIF]. 
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approved by local government amounted to judicial activism and legislating 
from the bench.6 
The trial court judge summarized the key issue in his decision: “The 
question before the Court, fundamentally, is whether the City’s Board of 
Aldermen had the discretion to say, in Alderman Bosley’s words, ‘Let’s try it.’ 
The Court concludes that the answer must be, ‘No.’”7 The trial court held that 
the massive redevelopment project impacting two square miles of urban land 
lacked the specificity of a “discrete, definable redevelopment project” required 
by the TIF statute.8 However, the finding of blight, also required by statute, 
though challenged, was found to be supported by “incontestable evidence.”9 
The developer, Paul McKee of NorthSide Regeneration, acknowledged 
that disallowing the TIF funding would prevent the entire multimillion dollar 
redevelopment project, one of the largest in St. Louis history, from getting 
started.10 McKee lost again in the Missouri Court of Appeals,11 but the 
Missouri Supreme Court reversed the lower courts on procedural grounds, 
largely side-stepping the substantive issues.12 The core issues behind the 
challenge to the TIF remain largely undecided in Missouri.13 
While the Missouri Supreme Court was deciding the NorthSide case, on 
the other side of the St. Louis metro area, a number of other controversial TIF 
projects of a different sort were being debated during the same week in January 
2013.14 These were targeted, discrete and definable projects unlikely to have 
statutory issues with specificity. Two involved TIF subsidies for Wal-Mart 
 
 6. See Dierker’s ‘Issue’ with McKee Goes Before Supreme Court, ST. LOUIS AM., Nov. 21, 
2012, at A11, available at http://www.stlamerican.com/news/political_eye/article_70918aec-32 
61-11e2-a1e1-0019bb2963f4.html?mode=print. 
 7. Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897, at *2. 
 8. Id. at *46. 
 9. Id. at *28. 
 10. See Logan, supra note 1, at A1. 
 11. Smith v. St. Louis (Smith II), No. ED95733, 2012 WL 2317240, at *13 (Mo. Ct. App. 
E.D. June 19, 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 395 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Mo. 2013). 
 12. Smith v. St. Louis (Smith III), 395 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (holding “the 
judgment [of the lower court] went beyond the scope of pleadings”). The Smith cases at the 
circuit, appellate, and Missouri Supreme Court are also referred to as the “NorthSide cases” or the 
“McKee cases” in this article, in keeping with references by local media and the court. 
 13. See, e.g., Tim Logan, NorthSide TIF Wins Backing of High Court, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Apr. 10, 2013, at A6 (“The judges didn’t directly tackle the legality of NorthSide’s 
$390 million tax increment financing package or TIF law more broadly, instead ruling largely on 
a procedural issue.”). 
 14. See Steve Giegerich, Wal-Mart Dispute Headed to Court, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Jan. 20, 2013, at B3 [hereinafter Wal-Mart Dispute]; Steve Giegerich, Shrewsbury Board 
Approves Wal-Mart Proposal, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.stltoday. 
com/news/local/shrewsbury-board-approves-walmart-proposal/article_a78be785-b679-5763-a8 
ae-230a71b9bed2.html [hereinafter Shewsbury Wal-Mart Proposal]. 
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Supercenters in separate St. Louis area municipalities, one in Shrewsbury and 
one in Ellisville.15 
Large numbers of residents and community leaders, along with local 
media, protested the Wal-Mart and similar TIFs as a waste of taxpayer funds.16 
They ridiculed the finding of “blight” in suburban shopping areas in order to 
obtain TIF, and complained about lack of fair representation in the TIF 
approval process.17 Both the Ellisville and the Shrewsbury Wal-Mart proposals 
were rejected by their respective local TIF commissions18 which are required 
by statute and are appointed specifically to review and assess the impacts of 
each TIF on the community.19 One Ellisville TIF Commissioner found the 
project to be a “gross overuse” of TIF incentives.20 Both the Ellisville and the 
Shrewsbury Boards of Aldermen overrode the recommendation of the TIF 
boards and approved the TIFs, which is permissible under Missouri statutory 
TIF procedure.21 While approval of the McKee NorthSide TIF funding 
affecting two square miles of the St. Louis inner city was rejected by the trial 
and appellate courts and, as a result, was tied up for over three years, TIF 
funding for the two Wal-Marts was approved in accordance with TIF statute 
and did not face such challenges in the courts.22 
The theory behind TIF is relatively straightforward, but the practice has 
been controversial for decades.23 Much of the controversy today stems from 
the evolution of TIF so that it now subsidizes shopping mall development in 
the same way, with the same statutory framework, as it originally subsidized 
inner city redevelopment. 
This note looks at the Missouri cases involving the McKee NorthSide 
redevelopment and examines the statutory structure that has given rise to 
apparent inequities in taxpayer funding of TIF redevelopment. The note 
proposes a change in Missouri TIF legislation to address these issues and to 
clarify statutory standards so developers of both large- and small-scale projects 
 
 15. See sources cited supra note 14. 
 16. See Wal-Mart Dispute, supra note 14. 
 17. See Gentrification by TIF, supra note 5. 
 18. See sources cited supra note 14. 
 19. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.820 (2010). 
 20. Editorial, Retail Roulette, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 7, 2012, at A12. 
 21. § 99.820. 
 22. Wal-Mart Dispute, supra note 14. A dispute over the proposed construction of the 
Ellisville Wal-Mart did, in fact, end up in court. However, it was the “conditional use permit” that 
was challenged, a completely separate issue from the TIF. The Ellisville Wal-Mart TIF was 
approved in accordance with the TIF statute, and the $10.8 million in TIF funding has not been 
challenged. See id. 
 23. See, e.g., Joyce Y. Man, Introduction to TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 1, 4–6 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001) (outlining criticisms of TIF 
going back to the 1980s and 1990s). 
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can be clearer on the law and their funding, and so courts can adjudicate 
effectively without excessive interpretation of statutory terms. 
This note advocates adopting legislation that would create two tiers of TIF 
in Missouri law. The first TIF tier, more in keeping with the original intent of 
TIF as an incentive for redevelopment and regeneration of neighborhoods,24 
would be targeted at district-wide TIFs and require adherence to strict 
standards of blight not presently in Missouri TIF law. However, it would allow 
more flexibility in contingent projects within the TIF plan, and provide 
additional incentives for redevelopment. The second tier of TIF would be more 
in keeping with current application of TIF as a purely developmental tool for 
specific projects in all neighborhoods. It would eliminate essentially 
meaningless blight requirements in current Missouri TIF law.25 
The note is divided into four parts. Focusing on Missouri, Part I overviews 
the basics of TIF law, outlining its general background and evolution, the 
theory behind TIF, and detailing its procedural and substantive elements as 
well as how developers, TIF commissions, and local government interact to 
approve a TIF. Part II examines Missouri court rulings involving blight and 
specificity, with special concentration on the NorthSide cases and their context 
with other cases in TIF law, as well as a clarification of deference standards 
given local government by the courts in TIF cases. Part II also looks at popular 
reaction to the NorthSide cases. Part III looks at the rationale for legislative 
change in TIF law proposed in this note: making the blight test meaningful and 
assuring specificity and accountability on the part of developers. Part III also 
examines the broader political and economic background of TIF law that lends 
support to the changes advocated, with special attention to current criticism 
and attempted reform of TIF. Part IV summarizes the proposed changes to 
Missouri TIF law advocated in this note. 
I.  THE FUNDAMENTALS OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 
A. General Background and Evolution of TIF 
Since its origins in California in 1952, Tax Increment Financing (TIF) has 
evolved from a targeted incentive to spur urban renewal to the most popular 
form of public finance for local economic development projects in the United 
 
 24. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 25. See generally Josh Reinert, Tax Increment Financing In Missouri: Is It Time For Blight 
And But-For To Go?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1019 (2001) (proposing the elimination of blight 
requirement from Missouri TIF law). This note advocates Mr. Reinert’s proposed elimination of 
the blight standard, but expands on the proposal to address project specificity and accountability 
concerns. See id. 
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States.26 Today, almost all states have authorized TIF and over half of U.S. 
cities with populations over 100,000 have used TIF.27 Missouri use of TIF is 
high, ranking third in total TIF bond sales out of 35 states surveyed for the 
period 2005–2010.28 
TIF began with the limited purpose of clearing and rehabilitating “urban 
decay in downtown areas,” but has evolved in recent years to become “an all-
purpose economic development tool.”29 It has moved far beyond its initial core 
purpose for urban redevelopment to its current, more general application to 
subsidize developers in a range of development projects; TIF has expanded 
from “redevelopment” to “simply development.”30 The McKee NorthSide 
project could be characterized as “redevelopment;” the Ellisville and 
Shrewsbury Wal-Marts would more likely be characterized as “simply 
development.” 
As in the rest of the country,31 proposed TIF projects in Missouri now 
range widely in scope and purposefrom the 1,560-acre McKee NorthSide 
project in the core of St. Louis City impacting a potential 10,000 new homes32 
to the area within single stand-alone buildings, from shopping malls in affluent 
suburban areas to rural properties on farmland. Despite the tremendous 
variation in scope and purpose, each of these projects must meet the same 
criteria set forth in the Missouri TIF statute.33 
 
 26. See Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the 
Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 65 (2010); COUNCIL OF DEV. 
FIN. AGENCIES & INT’L COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CTRS., TAX INCREMENT FINANCE BEST 
PRACTICES REFERENCE GUIDE 2 (2007) available at http://www.icsc.org/government/CDFA.pdf 
[hereinafter TIF BEST PRACTICES GUIDE]. 
 27. Briffault, supra note 26, at 70. 
 28. Randal O’Toole, Crony Capitalism and Social Engineering: The Case Against Tax-
Increment Financing, 676 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 11–12 (2011), available at 
http://www.cato.org/publications/archives/studies/policy-analysis/2011. Missouri also ranked 
fourth in per capita TIF bond sales. Id. 
 29. Reinart, supra note 25, at 1023. 
 30. See Briffault, supra note 26, at 71 (“The redirection, or expansion, of TIF is best 
captured through the change in the language used to describe TIF activity from redevelopment—
that is, the revitalization of a once vibrant but now economically depressed or physically 
deteriorated area—to simply development, or increase in economic activity in an area that might 
have been vacant, farmland, undeveloped, or simply lightly developed.”). 
 31. See id. at 68. 
 32. Rebecca S. Rivas, Supreme Court Hears Northside’s Appeal, ST. LOUIS AM., Dec. 6–12, 
2012, at A1. 
 33. Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 
99.800–99.865 (2010). 
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B. How TIF Works 
The theory behind TIF is relatively straightforward. Tax revenues 
generated by the redevelopment itself (the incremental taxes) are diverted back 
into the project, and become a repayment stream to fund the core costs of the 
project.34 Real estate taxes in the redevelopment area are frozen at the pre-
development level.35 The real estate taxes generated from the increased 
valuation resulting from the development is referred to as the “increment.”36 
The real estate tax increments can be supplemented in some states, such as 
Missouri, with percentages of certain other local taxes generated by the new 
economic activities in the development, such as sales and utility taxes, which 
form the repayment funds that are channeled back to the project’s costs.37 
TIFs are almost invariably presented by their promoters as self-financing, a 
“pay-for-itself” redevelopment tool, requiring no need for additional taxes.38 
As the attorney for St. Louis developer McKee argued in oral arguments in 
front of the Missouri Supreme Court, “this is not a handout subsidy. It’s a 
reimbursement. Nobody gets a single dime until you do the work to the 
satisfaction of the city.”39 
C. Procedural Implementation of TIF: The Role of Local Government 
Both substantive and procedural requirements of TIF are usually governed 
by statute.40 The Missouri Real Property Tax Increment Allocation 
Redevelopment Act41 (the “TIF Act”) is a typical state TIF statute.42 
 
 34. See JAMES E. MELLO ET AL., SUMMARY OF THE MISSOURI REAL PROPERTY TAX 
INCREMENT ALLOCATION REDEVELOPMENT ACT 1 (2010), available at http://www.armstrong 
teasdale.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Summary%20of%20MO%20Real%20Property-8992445-
1.PDF; MICHAEL P. KELSAY, UNEVEN PATCHWORK: TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN KANSAS 
CITY 1 (2007), available at http://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/ordredirect.html?open&id=Kel 
sayKansasCity.html. 
 35. MELLO ET AL., supra note 34. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., TIF BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 26, at 2 (“The tax increment from a 
TIF district is created without raising taxes and without dipping into the tax value present at the 
time of adoption”); David Callies & Andrew Gowder, Jr., Introduction to TAX INCREMENT 
FINANCING xxi, xxi (David Callies & Andrew Gowder, Jr., eds., ABA Publishing, 2012) (“In 
theory, the diverted [TIF] stream is ‘free money’ used to pay for the redevelopment and then 
returned to its rightful place as part of a now-enhanced stream of revenue to the governmental 
bodies that levy such taxes on the property in the first place.”) 
 39. Nicholas Phillips, Listen to Oral Argument from Yesterday’s High Court Battle Over 
Paul McKee’s Project, RIVERFRONT TIMES BLOGS (Nov. 29, 2012), http://blogs.riverfronttimes. 
com/dailyrft/2012/11/oral_argument_supreme_court_mckee_north_side.php. 
 40. See Cory C. VanDyke, Fields of Dreams: The Expectation And Common Reality Of Tax 
Increment Financing, 79 UMKC L. REV. 791, 794 (2011). 
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Local government plays the operative role in the approval and actual 
implementation of a TIF project.43 In Missouri, a municipality must establish a 
TIF commission, which is given broad powers to “review redevelopment 
plans, keep all interested parties (including the public) informed of the 
district’s progression, and ultimately control the decision-making power of the 
TIF process.”44 The TIF commission consists of nine to twelve members, with 
representatives from the overall county and school districts impacted by the tax 
subsidy, in addition to the smaller municipality.45 For example, in St. Louis 
County, municipal TIF commissions consist of six members appointed by the 
county, three members appointed by the municipalities, two members 
appointed by the school boards, and one member to represent other taxing 
entities.46 
When a TIF proposal is introduced by developers or urban planning 
experts, it is the responsibility of the municipal TIF commission to create a 
“redevelopment plan” to lay out fully the objectives of the plan and include 
“estimated redevelopment project costs, the anticipated sources of funds to pay 
for the costs, evidence of the commitments to finance the project costs” and 
other financial information on the anticipated funding.47 
After public hearings with strict notice and comment requirements, the TIF 
commission votes and makes recommendations to the municipality’s 
governing body, typically its board of aldermen, who then must decide whether 
to implement the redevelopment plan by adopting ordinances.48 It is important 
to note that the statute only requires that the TIF commission make a 
recommendation and vote; it does not require that the commission approve the 
TIF.49 If a TIF plan is voted down by the TIF commission, the municipality 
can still approve it and move forward.50 Once the ordinances are approved by 
the municipality, the statute authorizes the municipality to “make and enter 
into all contracts necessary or incidental to the implementation and furtherance 
of its redevelopment plan or project”51 and to use any and all means 
 
 41. See Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 
99.800–99.865 (2010). 
 42. MELLO ET AL., supra note 34. 
 43. See Briffault, supra note 26. 
 44. VanDyke, supra note 40, at 795. 
 45. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.820.2 (2010). 
 46. See § 99.820.3; MELLO ET AL., supra note 34, at 2. 
 47. § 99.810. 
 48. See § 99.820.1(1); Reinert, supra note 25, at 1030–31. 
 49. § 99.820 
 50. § 99.820.1(1) (explaining that if TIF commission opposes the plan, the municipality can 
override the commission and approve it with a two-thirds majority vote; if the TIF commission 
approves the plan, only a simple majority is required). 
 51. § 99.810.1(2). 
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“reasonably necessary to achieve the objectives of the redevelopment plan.”52 
“Reasonable means” may include eminent domain.53 
D. The “Redevelopment Area,” the “Redevelopment Plan,” and the 
“Redevelopment Project” 
It is important to recognize the statutory distinction between 
redevelopment area, redevelopment plan and redevelopment project to fully 
understand current issues relating to specificity in Missouri TIF law.54 The 
“redevelopment area” must meet the substantive statutory requirements of the 
“blight” and “but-for” tests described below. 55 It is the area designated by the 
municipality that is subject of the redevelopment plan.56 The “redevelopment 
plan” is a statement of general objectives and financial reports created by the 
TIF commission and voted on by the municipal Board, and it is essentially the 
ultimate vehicle for obtaining approval of TIF funding.57 This redevelopment 
plan must “conform to the comprehensive plan for the development of the 
municipality as a whole.”58 “Redevelopment project” is defined as simply “any 
development project within a redevelopment area in furtherance of the 
objectives of the redevelopment plan.”59 A “redevelopment project” is required 
before approval of the overall redevelopment plan that initiates the TIF itself.60 
The statutory interpretation of the specificity necessary for a redevelopment 
project is the core issue that decided the McKee cases.61 
E. Substantive Elements of a TIF: The Blight and “But for” Tests 
The substantive requirements of developments that qualify for TIF are 
written into statutes that vary from state to state, but usually share three 
common characteristics.62 First, the redevelopment area, sometimes referred to 
 
 52. § 99.810.1(3). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See § 99.805(12)-(14). 
 55. § 99.805 (12); § 99.805 (13). 
 56. § 99.805(11). 
 57. § 99.805(13) (defining “redevelopment plan” as “the comprehensive program of a 
municipality for redevelopment intended by the payment of redevelopment costs to reduce or 
eliminate those conditions, the existence of which qualified the redevelopment area as a blighted 
area, conservation area, economic development area, or combination thereof, and to thereby 
enhance the tax bases of the taxing districts which extend into the redevelopment area. Each 
redevelopment plan shall conform to the requirements of section 99.810”). See also Smith I, 2010 
WL 7352897, at *22, *25. 
 58. § 99.810.1 (2). 
 59. § 99.805 (13). 
 60. § 99.810.1(3). 
 61. Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897, at *45. 
 62. See TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, 18 MO. PRACTICE SERIES: REAL ESTATE LAW § 26:2 (3d 
ed. 2006); See also Phillip J.F. Gehab, Tax Increment Financing Bonds as “Debt” Under State 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] SPECIFICITY, BLIGHT AND TWO TIERS OF TIF 263 
as a TIF district, typically must meet the statutory definition of “blight” or 
“economic underutilization.”63 Second, the economic development would not 
occur “but for” the development of the TIF.64 Finally, the redevelopment plan 
must provide detailed economic impact plans and clear timeframes.65 
In Missouri, the so-called “blighting test” does not necessarily require a 
finding of “blight”; the test is met if the redevelopment area is a “blighted 
area,” a “conservation area,” or an “economic development area.”66 “Blighted 
area” is defined as: 
an area which, by reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate street 
layout, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site improvements, 
improper subdivision or obsolete platting, or the existence of conditions which 
endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such 
factors, retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an 
economic or social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or 
welfare in its present condition and use.67 
A “conservation area” is “not yet a blighted area but is detrimental to the 
public health, safety, morals, or welfare.”68 An “economic development area” 
can be any area that is neither blighted nor a conservation area, but where “the 
municipality finds that the redevelopment will not be solely used for 
development of commercial businesses which unfairly compete in the local 
economy.”69 
The “but for” test requires that the proposed TIF area has “not been subject 
to growth and development through investment by private enterprise and 
would not reasonably be anticipated to be developed without the adoption of 
 
Constitutional Debt Limitations, 41 URB. LAW. 725, 728 (2009); TIF BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, 
supra note 26, at 8. 
 63. TIF BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 26, at 8. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810.1(1) (2010). See also Reinert, supra note 25, at 1033. 
 67. § 99.805(1). 
 68. § 99.805(3) The full definition of a conservation area in the statute is an area where “fifty 
percent or more of the structures in the area have an age of thirty-five years or more. Such an area 
is not yet a blighted area but is detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare and 
may become a blighted area because of any one or more of the following factors: dilapidation; 
obsolescence; deterioration; illegal use of individual structures; presence of structures below 
minimum code standards; abandonment; excessive vacancies; overcrowding of structures and 
community facilities; lack of ventilation, light or sanitary facilities; inadequate utilities; excessive 
land coverage; deleterious land use or layout; depreciation of physical maintenance; and lack of 
community planning.” Id. 
 69. § 99.805(5). To be an “economic development area,” the area must be in the public 
interest because it will: (a) Discourage commerce, industry or manufacturing from moving their 
operations to another state; or (b) Result in increased employment in the municipality; or (c) 
Result in preservation or enhancement of the tax base of the municipality. 
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tax increment financing.”70 In other words, the TIF must be the “but-for” cause 
of the growth in taxes for the area and not existing market or socio-economic 
factors that were already in place without the TIF. 
II.  MISSOURI COURT RULINGS ON TIF BLIGHT AND SPECIFICITY 
A. Cases of Statutory Blight 
Although a redevelopment area must pass the “blight test” to receive TIF 
funding in Missouri,71 the statutory requirements of “blight” are extremely 
broad.72 In a controversial landmark case in 2001, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals held that a redevelopment project within the West County Center 
shopping mall in suburban St. Louis met the statutory definition of blighting 
required for TIF, despite the fact that both the municipality and the trial court 
found that the shopping center was “indisputably [the] City’s greatest 
economic asset.”73 The suburban city, Des Peres, was the second wealthiest 
municipality in the St. Louis area at the time.74 The court refused to “substitute 
[its] judgment for that of the [municipal] Board . . . as to blighting.”75 
Under the terms of the statute, the Court found that the municipality could 
declare the shopping mall “blighted” under the Missouri TIF statute because of 
such factors as: “its limited space for small retail shops inhibits growth” (thus, 
“obsolete platting”); “improper subdivision . . . that constrain the ability to 
expand the size of the mall;” “deteriorated site conditions” such as a faulty 
roof; “problems with the mall’s water lines” (“potentially endanger mall 
property”); and “evidence of a decline in sales at [the] shopping mall” 
(“economic liability”).76 The court found plaintiffs’ argument unpersuasive 
“that the blighting factors are minimally significant and do not dominate the 
redevelopment area.”77 
 
 70. § 99.810.1(1). 
 71. In addition to a “blighted area”, a “conservation area” or “economic development area” 
also passes the so-called “blight test” in the statute. Id. 
 72. See VanDyke supra note 40, at 799. 
 73. JG St. Louis W. Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Des Peres, 41 S.W.3d 513, 518 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 
2001). 
 74. See Reinert, supra note 25, at 1019. 
 75. JG St. Louis W., 41 S.W.3d at 518. 
 76. Id. Note that “obsolete platting;” “Improper subdivision,” “conditions which 
endanger . . . property,” “deterioration of site improvements,” and “other causes, or any 
combination of such factors . . . [that] constitutes an economic or social liability” are all elements 
of the statutory definition of “blighted area” that were met by the West County Center shopping 
mall, as determined by the municipality and as affirmed by the Court. See MO. REV. STAT. § 
99.805(1) (2010). 
 77. JG St. Louis W., 41 S.W.3d at 519. 
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When such an expansive statutory definition of blighting is combined with 
strong deference to the local municipality by the courts, and with precedents 
such as the West County shopping mall case, Missouri courts rarely question a 
municipality’s finding of blight.78 
B. Standard of Review: Deference to Local Government 
It is important to understand the great deference courts are required to 
show local government in typical TIF cases.79 The “[c]ourt’s role is narrowly 
circumscribed” and the municipality is given a high level of deference.80 The 
court must confine itself to determining if procedural mandates have been 
observed, necessary findings have been made, and whether the municipality’s 
ordinances are arbitrary, capricious, the product of fraud, collusion or bad 
faith, or otherwise beyond the municipality’s powers.81 Even if the 
municipality’s legislative findings are “fairly debatable” or “reasonably 
doubtful,” the court has no authority to invalidate the ordinances.82 
In other words, the court cannot simply substitute its judgment for the 
municipal Board.83 The municipality is making a determination that is 
considered “legislative” under the Missouri Constitution and treated as such by 
the court.84 If the court finds, for example, there is a reasonable argument that 
under the statute the redevelopment area is blighted or a redevelopment project 
is specific enough, as determined by the municipality, then it must leave the 
TIF approval intact. The municipality’s determination could even be 
“doubtful,” but as long as it is “reasonably” doubtful, the court must not 
disturb it.85 The court can only overturn the local government’s determination 
if the determination is invalid beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
 78. See Reinert, supra note 25, at 1050. 
 79. TIF Cases for eminent domain have a less deferential standard and are subject to 
constitutional demands. See generally Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897. 
 80. See, e.g., Tierney v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth. of Kansas City, 742 S.W.2d 146, 
159 (Mo. 1987); Meramec Valley R-III Sch. Dist. v. Eureka, 281 S.W.3d 827, 840 (Mo. Ct. App. 
E.D. 2009); JG St. Louis W., 41 S.W.3d at 519–20. 
 81. See Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 160; Eureka, 281 S.W.3d at 840; JG St. Louis W., 41 S.W.3d 
at 517. 
 82. Eureka, 281 S.W.3d at 836; JG St. Louis W. 41 S.W.3d at 517. 
 83. See Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 160; Eureka, 281 S.W.3d at 836; JG St. Louis W., 41 S.W.3d 
at 517. 
 84. Though municipalities do not have “inherent” legislative powers, the Missouri 
Constitution may grant municipalities certain legislative powers. The Missouri TIF Act allows 
municipalities to make legislative determinations as to what constitutes “blighted property.” See 
Reinert, supra note 25, at 1050. 
 85. Eureka, 281 S.W.3d at 836. 
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C. Specificity of the Project: The NorthSide TIF Cases 
The key issue in Paul McKee’s redevelopment cases at the trial court86 and 
Missouri Court of Appeals87 is different from the majority of TIF cases.88 The 
case turned not on the blight requirement, but on the specificity in the 
“redevelopment project” that the statute requires.89 In the trial court ruling, 
Judge Dierker stated that the fundamental issue in the case was that the city 
board did not have the discretion to approve a TIF and “try it.”90 The court 
required specifically detailed projects.91 
The finding of blight on the north St. Louis project area, though 
challenged, was supported by “incontestable evidence of obsolete platting, 
deterioration of site improvements, and higher than average crime rates.”92 
The trial court found the NorthSide redevelopment plan approved by the 
St. Louis Board of Aldermen did comply with statutory requirements.93 
However, the trial court found the “fatal flaw” to be a lack of specificity in any 
“discrete, definable redevelopment project” (emphasis added) as required by 
statute, thus making the ordinances that created the TIF invalid.94 The trial 
court noted that most TIF cases: 
“have involved discrete, definable projects, such as the shopping center 
upgrade in JG St. Louis West . . . Of late, however, the TIF redevelopment 
plans have grown in grandeur and scope . . . The problem is, however, that 
without a defined project, the TIF redevelopment process allows cities to 
expand redevelopment area designations ad infinitum.”95 
The court made clear the distinction between a redevelopment “project” and a 
redevelopment “plan”: “The plan is not the project. Concepts are not projects. 
Projects are concrete, not hypothetical or abstract: sanitary sewers will be 
constructed in City Block 1000, commencing on such-and-such a date, at an 
estimated cost of so many dollars.”96 The court goes on to say that “the TIF act 
requires that a redeveloper present ‘shovel-ready’ redevelopment projects.”97 
 
 86. Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897. 
 87. Smith II, 2012 WL 2317240. 
 88. State ex rel. Devanssay v. McGuire, 622 S.W.2d 323 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
 89. Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897, at *12. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at *15. 
 92. Id. at *11. 
 93. Id. The statutory requirements of a “redevelopment plan” are minimal. Id. (citing 
McGuire, 622 S.W.2d at 327 (the trial court found “all that was required was enough information 
to permit the Board of Aldermen to determine the plan’s feasibility, and the courts ‘must 
presume’ a certain expertise in the Board and the bureaucracy in evaluating such feasibility.”)). 
 94. Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897 , at *18. 
 95. Id. at *18. (emphasis added). 
 96. Id. at *15. 
 97. Id. at *17–18. 
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The court found that the developers used less specific language and 
deliberately chose to omit defined projects, and seemed to imply a comparison 
of McKee’s NorthSide development to a pipe dream, and the 1989 film, Field 
of Dreams, with the classic line, “If you build it, they will come.”98 
The trial court relied heavily on a Missouri Court of Appeals decision, City 
of Shelbina v. Shelby County,99 where a TIF approved by the Missouri City of 
Shelbina was struck down because it referenced only “aspirational goals and 
conceptual frameworks” in its redevelopment plan and lacked any specific 
projects.100 In Shelbina, the court held that the plain meaning of the statute101 
required that a specific redevelopment project must be approved or acts 
establishing the specific project must be approved prior to TIF approval by the 
municipality.102 The court cited language in Shelbina’s TIF plan such as “may 
be implemented,” “assumes that,” “envisions that,” “program concept is 
intended to,” “could include,” and so forth, as indications that there was no 
specific project in place.103 For example, the plan stated that it solicited 
proposals for part of the development “intended to result in a scenario where a 
property owned by the City will be redeveloped into . . . commercial uses 
which could include a gas station . . . .”104 The court found that this language 
made clear that the city did not have the specific projects required by statute 
and invalidated the TIF.105 
The Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the trial court decision in the 
NorthSide case, finding the project specificity issues analogous to Shelbina: 
“aspirational goals and conceptual frameworks” in the redevelopment plan, but 
no “actual data regarding particular projects.”106 The court cited the 
redevelopment plan as being “couched in terms of ‘anticipated,’ ‘may be,’ 
‘contemplated,’ and ‘depending on market demand’” generally describing 
“NorthSide’s ideas for land use” but providing no “specifics detailing 
impending redevelopment projects” and concluded “these ‘proposals’ are not 
sufficient to be considered a project under Shelbina.”107 NorthSide attorneys 
 
 98. Id. at *1, *17. 
 99. Shelbina v. Shelby Cnty., 245 S.W.3d 249 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2008). 
 100. Id. at 253. 
 101. Id. The Court specifically cites Section 99.845.1 of the TIF statute which states “A 
municipality, either at the time a redevelopment project is approved or, in the event a 
municipality has undertaken acts establishing a redevelopment plan and redevelopment project 
and has designated a redevelopment area after the passage and approval of Sections 99.800 to 
99.865 . . . which acts are in conformance with the procedures of Sections 99.800 to 99.865, may 
adopt tax increment allocation financing by passing an ordinance . . . (Emphasis added).” 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Shelbina v. Shelby Cnty., 245 S.W.3d 249, 253–54 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D 2008). 
 106. Smith II, 2012 WL 2317240, at *11. 
 107. Id. 
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argued that Shelbina was distinguishable because there was no developer in 
Shelbina and the TIF was only a vehicle for soliciting proposals for 
redevelopment with a vague conceptual objective, unlike McKee and 
NorthSide.108 Attorneys also argued that the trial court exercised “judicial 
activism” not advocated by the appellate court in Shelbina, nor by the plain 
meaning of the statute.109 The court found these arguments unpersuasive in its 
ruling.110 
From a procedural perspective, it was extraordinary that plaintiffs in the 
trial court case did not even raise the issue of project specificity in their 
pleadings, though that was the issue that decided the case.111 Plaintiffs’ 
pleading raised the issues of blight, the “but for” test, and the City’s good faith, 
among other things.112 The trial court denied each of plaintiffs’ points in the 
pleading, but the decision was made in favor of the plaintiffs on a separate 
issue “detected by the Court,” which involved the statutorily required 
specificity of the redevelopment project.113 Even the trial court acknowledged 
that “there may be an argument that the defect in [the TIF] Ordinances . . . 
detected by the Court was not fairly embraced by the pleadings in this case.”114 
The trial court, however, accepted plaintiffs’ motions in limine and objections 
at trial “as injecting specific claims of invalidity of the ordinances, and not as 
mere evidentiary objections.”115 At the Missouri Court of Appeals, NorthSide 
attorneys argued that a legal or factual challenge was never raised “based upon 
a lack of sufficiency of the redevelopment project in [plaintiff’s] pleadings or 
at trial,” and, therefore, the trial court’s judgment was void.116 The appellate 
court upheld the validity of the judgment, finding that the redevelopment 
project issue was “tried by the implied consent of the parties.”117 
At the Missouri Supreme Court, however, in a 6-0 decision, the lower 
court’s ruling on specificity of the project plan was set aside on procedural 
grounds.118 The court held that: 
“the petitions did not place Northside on notice that the specific project issue 
was a subject of this litigation and, therefore, did not preserve that issue for 
purposes of this case. . . the judgment went beyond the scope of pleadings and 
 
 108. Brief of Appellant at 41, NorthSide Regeneration LLC, Smith v. St. Louis, No. 
ED95733, 2012 WL 2317240 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. June 19, 2012). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Smith II, 2012 WL 2317240, at *10–11. 
 111. See Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897, at *2–3. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at *18. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at *3. 
 116. Smith II, 2012 WL 2317240, at *4. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Smith III, 395 S.W.3d at 26, 24–26. 
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is voidable to the extent that it provides that there are no defined 
redevelopment projects or a cost-benefit analysis of such projects.”119 
The Missouri Supreme Court did not address the issue of TIF specificity in 
its ruling120 and, thus, the issue has not been addressed fully and conclusively 
in Missouri courts.121 Lawyers for plaintiffs indicated they had no plans to 
pursue further legal action against NorthSide.122 The level of specificity 
required for a TIF to meet the requirements of the statute remains an open 
question in Missouri. 
D. Public Reaction to the NorthSide TIF Case 
The NorthSide rulings were controversial, and the opinions on the 
decisions were sharply divided. However, local media was largely supportive 
of the project, and coverage on the matter continued for years.123 A lengthy 
editorial on the topic in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch in December 2012, titled 
“Give NorthSide a Chance,”124 forcefully stated the paper’s support for the 
project since the project went public in 2009.125 The paper contrasted the 
NorthSide TIF with other TIFs in the St. Louis area that have “abused TIF laws 
by granting subsidies in well-to-do suburbs for big-box retail projects that 
cannibalize older retail operations . . . Meanwhile, the city’s overwhelmingly 
poor, African-American north side is bogged down in court. Weeds grow, 
criminals flourish, the few remaining residents hang on for dear life.”126 
A local African-American periodical, the St. Louis American 
(“American”), was among the staunchest supporters of the TIF, stating on its 
Editorial page, “We encourage those who dislike McKee but care about the 
future of the city to reconsider the critical value of his proposal to bring 
development and jobs to an area of the city sorely lacking in both.”127 The 
American even publicly debated the legal issues and judges involved in the 
case, responding to an email from attorney Eric Vickers128 that stated, “The 
American has thoroughly skewered and castigated Judge Robert Dierker for his 
 
 119. Id. at 24, 26. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 13. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See, e.g., Give NorthSide a Chance, supra note 2; Gentrification by TIF, supra note 5; 
Rivas, supra note 32. 
 124. See Give NorthSide a Chance, supra note 2. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Editorial, Perception vs. Law in Northside Appeal, ST. LOUIS AM. (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://www.stlamerican.com/news/editorials/article_dcbdcf1e-39c8-11e2-a33a-001a4bcf88 
7a.html. 
 128. Vickers argued for plaintiffs as intervener in the NorthSide cases. See Smith II, 2012 WL 
2317240. 
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decision to void McKee’s proposal for being only a plan and not a project, his 
decision rests squarely and entirely on the well-reasoned appellate decision [in 
Shelbina]129of Supreme Court Justice George W. Draper III [supported by the 
American for appointment to the Missouri Supreme Court].”130 The American 
responded by stating it believes “Draper will show his sound legal judgment in 
ruling that the narrow precedent he established in Shelbina does not pertain to 
a redevelopment project that actually has a redeveloper and a redevelopment 
agreement.”131 
In addition to the media, a number of politicians and attorneys weighed in 
on the matter. City of St. Louis Mayor Francis Slay stated that he was 
committed to proceeding with the NorthSide development regardless of the 
courts.132 He said it “was a very complex legal issue” but that his development 
team was “absolutely” considering options and that “Paul McKee is moving 
forward with his project.”133 St. Louis Alderman Scott Ogilvie stated that “Paul 
McKee’s problems are our problems” because North St. Louis’ problems are 
St. Louis’ problems.134 
A brief signed by the three attorneys representing the City of St. Louis, the 
Board of Aldermen and the TIF Commission states, “Taken to its logical end, 
[the] approach [of our opponents] will unavoidably require Missouri’s courts 
to second-guess legislative decisions and micromanage TIF-financed 
redevelopment.”135 
On the other side of the argument, north city residents stated that the plan 
of NorthSide Regeneration was “pie-in-the-sky” and caused their property 
values to drop.136 Bevis Schock, attorney for several north city residents, 
argued before the Missouri Supreme Court, “I represent people who’ve been 
harmed . . . So who is harmed? My client is harmed!”137 After the Missouri 
Supreme Court ruling which allowed NorthSide to go ahead with TIF plans, 
 
 129. Shelbina v. Shelby Cnty., 245 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2008). 
 130. Editorial, No Dilemma Between Draper and Shelbina, ST. LOUIS AM., Dec. 6, 2012, at 
A10. 
 131. Id. 
 132. State Supreme Court to Weigh in on McKee Plan, CBS ST. LOUIS LOCAL (Nov. 26, 
2012), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2012/11/26/state-supreme-court-to-weigh-in-on-mckee-plan/. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Dierker’s ‘Issue’ with McKee Goes Before Supreme Court, supra note 6, at A11. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Nicholas Phillips, Listen to Oral Argument from Yesterday’s High Court Battle Over 
Paul McKee’s Project, RIVERFRONT TIMES BLOGS (Nov. 29, 2012), http://blogs.riverfronttimes. 
com/dailyrft/2012/11/oral_argument_supreme_court_mckee_north_side.php. 
 137. Id. 
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Schock commented, “This is classic ‘crony capitalism’. . . [i]t’ll never 
work.”138 
Among the most vocal critics of the NorthSide plan was the chair of 
Washington University’s Department of Economics, Mr. Michele Boldrin, who 
testified at the trial that the benefits promised by McKee such as new jobs and 
increases in property value were “dreamy,” “out of thin air,” “unreasonable,” 
and “completely arbitrary”139 and further stated that “if an MBA student came 
up with it, I’d throw him out of my office.”140 
Though reaction to NorthSide rulings was mixed and sometimes sharp, the 
attacks were largely on the specificity of developer Paul McKee’s plan or on 
personal concerns with McKee, not the broader objective of redeveloping the 
north side of St. Louis itself. 141 Attorney Schock stated, “The heart of this case 
and 90 percent of the arguments focus on whether a project means a specific 
building that has a door, a roof, a purpose, or not.”142 A St. Louis planner 
remarked, “There is such a thing as making the area so big that you really can’t 
have the plan be completely believable,” and, he said, “Maybe that’s what this 
one is suffering from.”143 
III.  THE RATIONALE FOR PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGE TO 
MISSOURI TIF LAW 
A. The Meaning of “Blight” 
The original intent of TIF was “the clearance and rehabilitation of urban 
decay in downtown areas”144 so, logically, “blight” was set as an essential 
 
 138. Adam Allington, Mo. Supreme Court Gives Paul McKee Green Light on Northside 
Project, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO NEWS BLOG (Apr. 9, 2013), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/ 
mo-supreme-court-gives-paul-mckee-green-light-northside-project. 
 139. Nicholas Phillips, Wash U. Economist Rips McKee’s Plan for North St. Louis in First 
Day of Trial, RIVERFRONT TIMES BLOGS (Feb. 17, 2010), http://blogs.riverfronttimes.com/daily 
rft/2010/02/wash_u_economist_rips_mckees_plan_for_the_north_side.php. 
 140. Jeff Carroll & Michael Offerman, Blight, Plight & Urban Flight, WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS OLIN SUSTAINABILITY CASE COMPETITION (2013), available at 
http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/mba/casecompetition/PDF/2013OSCCCaseFinal.pdf. 
 141. See, e.g., Give NorthSide a Chance, supra note 2 (“Ever since Mr. McKee started 
secretly buying parcels before convincing the Legislature to help him with tens of millions of 
dollars in tax incentives, there have been people in St. Louis rooting for his failure. . .he’s a white 
guy from the suburbs. . .he kept things secret for a while, even to the point of letting properties 
run down. . .the idea is a long shot. But he’s working in a part of the city that began hollowing out 
in the 1950s”). 
 142. Rivas, supra note 32. 
 143. Logan, supra note 1. 
 144. Reinert, supra note 25, at 1023. 
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element of any area proposed for TIF redevelopment.145 However, the meaning 
of blight in TIF law has evolved to the point where such a designation has “lost 
any real meaning.”146 In testimony before the St. Louis TIF Commission, one 
observer found that “‘blighting’ . . . [which is] supposed to be subject to 
independent analysis [is] a rigged game.”147 Many find that “nearly any area 
can qualify as blighted.”148 As one author noted, 
the court’s semantic manipulation of the term “blight” ignores an underlying 
reality that many of the controversial TIF projects in Missouri are not, by 
common-sense standards, blighted. Thus, the TIF blighting test is made at best 
illogical and at worse meaningless by the court’s statutory construction of the 
term.149 
Under the standard of review for typical TIF cases,150 the court is not 
permitted to substitute its judgment for the municipal board.151 As held in JG 
St. Louis West, LLC v. Des Peres, factors such as limited space, improper 
subdivision, a faulty roof, and so forth can meet the statutory definition of 
“blight” if a municipality finds it.152 Thus, blight was found in a suburban 
shopping mall deemed to be the economic engine of one of the wealthiest 
suburbs in the area.153 
 
 145. See, e.g., Kenneth Hubbell & Peter J. Eaton, Tax Increment Financing in the State of 
Missouri, MSCDC Economic Report Series No. 9703, at 2 (1997) available at http://www.cdfa. 
net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/ordredirect.html?open&id=HubbellEatonMissouri (“Early on, states 
restricted TIF projects to ‘blighted’ or ‘substandard’ areas within the community. But over time, 
bending to local political pressures, the requirements for such a designation were watered down 
and lost any real meaning.”); Kenneth Thomas Luce, Reclaiming the Intent: Tax Increment 
Finance in the Kansas City and St. Louis Metropolitan Areas, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION CENTER 
ON URBAN AND METROPOLITAN POLICY, Apr. 2003, at 3 (author argues that combating blight as 
“true purpose of TIF” and focuses study on “reclaiming the intent” of TIF.). 
 146. KELSAY, supra note 34. 
 147. David Stokes, The Use of Tax Increment Financing in the City of Saint Louis: Testimony 
Before the Tax Increment Financing Commission of the City of Saint Louis, SHOW-ME 
INSTITUTE, (Oct. 29, 2012), at 2, available at http://showmeinstitute.org/publications/testimony/ 
corporate-welfare/848-tif-in-saint-louis.html. 
 148. VanDyke, supra note 40, at 799. 
 149. Reinert, supra note 25, at 1050. 
 150. The standard of review described is used in TIF cases where no eminent domain or 
condemnation is involved. 
 151. See, e.g., Tierney v. Planned Indus. Exp. Auth., 742 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); 
Meramec Valley R-III Sch. Dist. v. Eureka, 281 S.W.3d 827 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2009); JG St. 
Louis West, LLC v. Des Peres, 41 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2001). 
 152. JG St. Louis W., 41 S.W.3d at 518. 
 153. Id. See also Reinert, supra note 25, at 1019–1022; Ray Hartman, Des Peres Has Gone 
Mad, But Don’t Take My Word for It, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Oct 6, 1999. (Economist Murray 
Weidenbaum states, “To describe it [the West County mall] as a blighted area and keep a straight 
face is quite a trick.”). 
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Since the courts must defer to the municipality’s finding of blight, and 
since there are no meaningful standards of blight in the statute, blight can be 
found in almost any area, making the statutory meaning of blight essentially 
meaningless.154 The result of the lack of a meaningful blight standard in TIF 
law is that there is no economic incentive under TIF to develop in the areas 
that need it the most.155 
For example, a study in Kansas City found that 88% of TIF plans are in 
areas that contain the most affluent and best educated, while areas with high 
rates of poverty and unemployment receive only 12% of the TIFs.156 
In St. Louis, a study found that TIFs are used more frequently in higher-
income communities, giving them unneeded advantage and contributing to 
economic and racial disparity in St. Louis.157 They were used often in the more 
affluent central and west end of the city of St. Louis but little in the depressed 
sections of north St. Louis.158 As the study summarized, 
areas of concentrated poverty begin at a distinct disadvantage when trying to 
compete for customers, businesses and jobs and are further handicapped when 
higher-income communities receive additional advantages through diversion of 
tax dollars to private developers via tax incentives.159 
Another study specifically about TIF in Missouri, this one supported by the 
Brooking Institution,160 made a similar conclusion.161 It found that “Missouri 
law creates the potential for overuse and abuse of TIF. Vague definitions of the 
allowable use of TIF permit almost any municipality, including those market 
forces already favor, to use it.”162 It further concluded that because of these 
“flaws” in Missouri law, TIF is used in suburbs with little need for 
assistance.163 Particularly in the St. Louis area, the study found that “TIF 
money very frequently flows to purposes other than combating ‘blight’ in 
disadvantaged communities—its classic purpose.”164 
 
 154. No Dilemma Between Draper and Shelbina, supra note 130. 
 155. Luce, supra note 145. 
 156. KELSAY, supra note 34, at 25. 
 157. EAST-WEST GATEWAY COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS 
AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF THE USE OF DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES IN THE ST. LOUIS REGION: 
FINAL REPORT, 35–37 (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter EAST-WEST GATEWAY REP.], available at 
http://www.ewgateway.org/pdffiles/library/dirr/TIFFinalRpt.pdf. 
 158. Id. The proposed redevelopment area of the NorthSide TIF is in a part of St. Louis that 
has rarely been used for TIF prior to NorthSide. 
 159. Id. at 36. 
 160. The Brookings Institution was probably the first think-tank in the United States. 
Brookings Institution, SOURCE WATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Brookings_Insti 
tution (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 161. Luce, supra note 145, at v. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
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The study did not fault the tool of TIF itself, but found that “poorly 
designed TIF laws are being misused . . . As a result, a potentially dynamic 
tool for reinvestment in Missouri’s most disadvantaged communities . . . is 
abused by high-tax-base suburban areas that do not need public subsidies.”165 
Ironically, because of the structure of TIF laws in Missouri, the very areas 
that need it the most, the areas that would fit the dictionary definition of 
“blight,”166 are not receiving the benefit of TIF. The TIF statutory requirement 
of “blight” seems just a remnant of the early days of TIF which focused on 
redevelopment and “rehabilitation of urban decay in downtown areas.”167 
This note does not advocate the abolishment of TIF as a tool for non-
blighted areas by developers. Rather, it argues for a new and separate “tier” in 
Missouri TIF law that would further incentivize redevelopment in truly 
blighted areas and accommodate the special needs of large-scale blighted 
districts, such as that proposed by the NorthSide plan. Under the reform 
proposed in this note, a TIF redevelopment area that meets a heightened 
definition of blight would be given a separate “tier” in the Missouri TIF 
statute. Under the current Missouri TIF statute, a “redevelopment area” must 
meet the definition of either a “blighted area,” a “conservation area,” or an 
“economic development area.”168 This note will refer to an area that meets the 
proposed heightened standard of blight as a “true blight” area. 
The definition of “true blight” in the modified statute could restrict 
blighting to urban and residential areas and provide clearer, objective standards 
for determining blight.169 Modification to the blight definition was attempted in 
2002 in Missouri in the wake of the JG West St. Louis decision and the 
blighting of the West County Center shopping mall.170 The legislation, never 
enacted, includes objectively defined factors of high unemployment, low fiscal 
capacity, and moderate income in its definition of blight.171 Provisions from 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. According to Dictionary.com, blight refers to “impairment, destruction, ruin, or 
frustration” or “the state or result of being blighted or deteriorated; dilapidation; decay” as in 
“urban blight.” Blight, DICTONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/blight?s=t (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 167. Reinert, supra note 25, at 1023. 
 168. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805 (2010). 
 169. See Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the 
Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 305, 335 (2004). 
 170. Id. See S.B. 172, 92d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Mo. 2003) (unenacted), available at 
http://www.senate.state.mo.gov/03INFO/billtext/intro/SB172.htm. 
 171. S.B. 172, supra note 170. For example, the unenacted legislation defined “high 
unemployment” as “unemployment in the proposed redevelopment area of at least one and one-
half times that of the metropolitan statistical area in which the area is located.” “Low fiscal 
capacity” is defined as “per capita assessed valuation of property in the municipality of less than 
sixty percent of the entire county in which it is located.” “Moderate income” is defined in part as 
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this proposed legislation could be incorporated into the “true blight” 
redevelopment area definition. 
As former presidential economic advisor Murray Weidenbaum points out, 
“The idea of a TIF is to help truly blighted areas by providing a tax incentive 
for businesses to move into those areas.”172 Under the reform proposed in the 
note, a developer seeking TIF funding to develop an area where “true blight” is 
found would be entitled to special incentives and special provisions. 
First, a “true blight” area may be entitled to increased tax incentives. A 
general structure for increased incentives based on condition of redevelopment 
area already exists at both a state and local level.173 Under the current statute, 
additional tax incentives are available for blighted areas in pre-designated 
enterprise zones, empowerment zones or urban core areas.174 This is called a 
“State TIF” and allows access to incremental state sales tax to supplement the 
amount of the local TIF.175 Kansas City has also introduced a “Super TIF” to 
increase local incentives for residential development in “distressed areas.”176 
By using a clear defined statutory framework, two different levels of TIF 
incentives could be created, similar to the “State TIF” or “Super TIF,” with 
heightened incentives for areas with “true blight,” in relation to non-blighted 
development TIFs. 
Second, a “true blight” redevelopment area, if it encompasses a large area, 
would be allowed a more flexible two-step project implementation process and 
relaxed specificity as described below in section B. 
Finally, this note proposes either eliminating the definitions of blight 
currently in the statute entirely, or replacing these definitions with 
requirements that more realistically reflect the actual use of TIF for economic 
development in a range of non-blighted areas.177 This approach has been 
 
“median household income of under eighty percent of the median household income for the 
metropolitan statistical area.” 
 172. Ray Hartman, Des Peres Has Gone Mad, But Don’t Take My Word for It, RIVERFRONT 
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1999. Weidenbaum goes on to say that TIF is “not designed for middle-class 
neighborhoods. It’s designed for poor neighborhoods.” 
 173. See EAST-WEST GATEWAY REP., supra note 157. 
 174. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.845.4–99.845.14 (2010). 
 175. See MO. DEP’T OF ECON. DEV., STATE SUPPLEMENTAL TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 
PROGRAM (2007), available at http://ded.mo.gov/upload/tif%2811-07%29.pdf. 
 176. See CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MO., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES 4–5 (April 
2004), available at http://www.kcmo.org/idc/groups/cityplanningplanningdiv/documents/city 
planninganddevelopment/017322.pdf. The program has met with some criticism. See, e.g., Leigh 
McIlvaine, “Super TIF” EATs Kansas City Alive!, CLAWBACK, A BLOG OF GOOD JOBS FIRST 
(Sept. 25, 2008), http://clawback.org/2008/09/25/%E2%80%9Csuper-tif%E2%80%9D-eats-kan 
sas-city-alive/. 
 177. Reinert, supra note 25, at 1051–52. 
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proposed by several authors in the past,178 and, in fact, the states of Iowa and 
Indiana have dropped the “blight” test entirely.179 These states allow TIF to be 
used in “Economic Development Areas,”180 which more accurately reflects its 
actual use in Missouri, in areas such as suburban shopping malls and targeted 
retail outlets like Wal-Mart. Previous attempts by the legislature to exclusively 
limit TIF to an area like the “true blight” standard proposed above have failed 
to garner the necessary support from lawmakers on several occasions.181 This 
note proposes a solution that acknowledges the current use of TIF in suburban 
development, but would free municipalities from “being forced to make 
irrational declarations of blight that do not correspond to common-sense 
notions of the term.”182 These “irrational declarations of blight” infuriate the 
public because it seems a disingenuous use of taxpayer money.183 The State of 
Ohio proposed a test that might be substituted for the current blighting 
standard, based on “private market failure,” “sudden and severe economic 
dislocation,” “unintended government policy impact,”184 and so forth. This 
type of test, if carefully constructed, would serve to focus the TIF on true 
economic development benefiting the region, rather than meeting a blight 
standard that has no real meaning. 
B. Specificity and Accountability 
Smaller, project-specific TIFs, those whose “redevelopment area” is 
limited to a single structure or shopping mall, are unlikely to have specificity 
issues.185 They have a clear agenda, with developers and contractors lined up, 
typically for targeted retail development.186 On the other hand, large scale TIFs 
that impact entire districts, such as the NorthSide plan, have many more 
variables because of the time involved and the scale of infrastructural 
improvements needed.187 The NorthSide trial court contrasted “discrete, 
 
 178. Reinert, supra note 25 (Recall the title of the article is “Tax Increment Financing In 
Missouri: Is It Time For Blight And But-For To Go?”); David N. Farwell, A Modest Proposal: 
Eliminating Blight, Abolishing but-for, and Putting New Purpose in Wisconsin’s Tax Increment 
Financing Law, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 407, 431 (2005). 
 179. Hubbell & Eaton, supra note 145, at 1. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See S.B. 172 supra note 170; Reinert, supra note 25, at 1051. 
 182. Reinert, supra note 25, at 1051. 
 183. See, e.g., David Nicklaus, TIF Subsidy Tilts the Retail Playing Field, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 4, 2012 (commenting on a recent controversial use of TIF in St. Louis, “In plain, 
commonsense English, ‘blighted’ means that a property is an eyesore or a nuisance. In real estate 
law, it simply means that a property is eligible for a subsidy.”). 
 184. Reinert, supra note 25, at 1052. 
 185. See Logan, supra note 1. Urban planner John Brancaglione argues that the “easier” TIFs 
are “small and specific,” driven by developers often for retail projects. 
 186. Id. 
 187. TIF BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 26. 
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definable projects such as the shopping center upgrade in JG St. Louis West” 
with the “grandeur and scope” of redevelopment plans of NorthSide.188 
Concerns about specificity were the deciding factors in the NorthSide case at 
the Missouri Court of Appeals.189 The court found no “specifics detailing 
impending redevelopment projects,” citing terms like “anticipated” and 
“depending on market demand” in the TIF Plan, and on this basis, the TIF was 
declared invalid.190 
The attorney for NorthSide summarized the core issue of the case: 
“whether the TIF act can be used to subsidize large scale redevelopment 
projects that will evolve over time with changing markets, politics and 
technology.”191 He also stated that the court’s decision was “detached from the 
commercial reality of large scale redevelopment.”192 Opposing attorney Bevis 
Schock responded, “If Paul McKee thinks as a policy matter that we should 
have large-scale TIF . . . he should go to the Legislature and get the law 
changed.”193 
St. Louis-based urban planner John Brancaglione questioned TIF law that 
makes large projects harder to obtaining funding, “If you’re trying to induce 
development in a large area, why make it more difficult? . . . You want to 
make it more difficult when they’re going for a small project.”194 Brancaglione 
added that changes to Missouri law requiring more detailed financial 
projections have made it “tough for a city to create a district and then use the 
incentive to lure developers.”195 He added other successful large-scale TIFs, 
such as the Grand Center TIF which covered nearly 300 acres, might not “pass 
muster” under the current standards of TIF law.196 
While TIF has the greatest impact when entire neighborhoods are 
transformed, large scale plans need some level of flexibility over the duration 
of the plan, which could be decades. TIF plans can span up to twenty-three 
years.197 Missouri courts have held that “discrete, definable projects”198 must 
 
 188. Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897, at *18. 
 189. Smith II, 2012 WL 2317240. As noted previously the case was later overturned on 
procedural grounds by the Missouri Supreme Court. Smith III, 395 S.W.3d at 26. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Paul McKee Fights to Get His TIF Back for Northside Redevelopment Project, CBS 
LOCAL ST. LOUIS BLOG (Feb. 1, 2012), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2012/02/01/paul-mckee-fights-
to-get-his-tif-back-for-northside-redevelopment-project/. 
 192. Dierker’s ‘Issue’ with McKee Goes Before Supreme Court, supra note 6. 
 193. Logan, supra note 1. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. The $25 million Grand Center TIF, established in 2003, includes the main campus of 
Saint Louis University. See Lisa Brown, Grand Center’s Court Victory Resurrects $130 Million 
in Projects, ST. LOUIS BUS. J. (July 25, 2005). 
 197. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810(3) (2010). Estimated dates of completion can be up to twenty-
three years from the adoption of the ordinances approving the redevelopment project. 
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be presented prior to approval of the TIF plan.199 Missouri courts have found 
“aspirational” language such as “anticipated” and “depending on market 
demand” not sufficient to meet the requirement of a project under the TIF 
statute, and that it was likewise unacceptable that specific projects be decided 
at a later time.200 
The NorthSide TIF Redevelopment Plan, for example, stated that “up to 
approximately” 2,200 new homes and 7,800 apartments “may be” constructed, 
and that “up to approximately” 3,900 existing residential units could be 
retained or rehabilitated, depending on the condition of such units and the 
“market demand” for rehabilitated units.201 Another section states that an 
adjacent area may be developed with “medium density mixed-use projects that 
may contain ground floor retail with residences or offices above, depending 
upon the market demand for such uses.”202 The estimates and “aspirational 
language” was not acceptable to the Court.203 The trial court gave a 
hypothetical example of the specificity required for an acceptable project: 
“sanitary sewers will be constructed in City Block 1000, commencing on such-
and-such a date, at an estimated cost of so many dollars.”204 
NorthSide attorneys and others have argued that this approach makes large 
scale TIF plans impossible, even though they have been approved by local 
municipalities.205 They argue that a 1500-acre redevelopment spanning 
decades requires flexibility and that the level of specificity required should be 
left to the discretion of the municipality once a redevelopment agreement was 
executed with a redeveloper.206 Others have argued that the NorthSide plan 
was “pie-in-the-sky” and “unreasonable” and taxpayers must have the 
specificity necessary to be assured of a viable plan.207 
This note proposes that large-scale TIFs be approved in a more flexible, 
two-step process. The redevelopment plan would require specific projects, but 
not require that the specific projects for the entire redevelopment be presented 
beforehand, prior to TIF approval. Rather, the entire plan and the funding 
would be conditionally approved as the first step; but be contingent on a series 
 
 198. Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897, at *18. 
 199. Smith II, 2012 WL 2317240, at *8–9. 
 200. Id. at *11. 
 201. NORTHSIDE REGENERATION LLC, NORTHSIDE REGENERATION TAX INCREMENT 
FINANCING (TIF) REDEVELOPMENT PLAN 6 (2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/21 
411368/NorthSide-TIF-Redevelopment-Plan. 
 202. Id. at 21. 
 203. Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897, at *15. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Dierker’s ‘Issue’ with McKee Goes Before Supreme Court, supra note 6. 
 206. Brief of Appellant, Smith v. St. Louis, No. ED95733, 2012 WL 2317240, at *41–43 
(Mo. Ct. App. E.D. June 19, 2012). 
 207. See supra notes 136 and 139 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] SPECIFICITY, BLIGHT AND TWO TIERS OF TIF 279 
of “discrete, specific projects” that the municipality would approve on a 
project-by-project basis through the course of the redevelopment. This note 
also advocates modifying the TIF statute to include so-called “accountability 
statutes” or “clawback” provisions that allow taxpayers to recoup the value of 
local tax incentives if those outcomes don’t materialize.208 The proposed 
statute would require the municipality to detail in the TIF agreement particular 
levels of performance expected and consequences for not meeting these 
expectations.209 
To qualify for the increased level of flexibility this note proposes, the 
redevelopment area must meet the standards of “true blight” and the area must 
encompass a statutorily set minimum threshold of geographic size. This 
approach allows the developer the necessary flexibility to implement large-
scale redevelopment, but also assures that the municipality is provided a 
reasonable level of specificity by requiring definable projects, as well as 
accountability and remedy through “clawback” provisions if the developer 
does not deliver promised work or outcomes. 
IV.  SUMMARY OF PROPOSED CHANGES TO MISSOURI TAX INCREMENT 
FINANCING LAW 
This note proposes changes to Missouri law to accommodate the distinct 
characteristics of two different types of TIF. First, the proposal creates a new 
level or “tier” of TIF, which provides for increased incentives and increased 
flexibility. In order to qualify for these special incentives, a TIF must meet the 
standards of “true blight” in keeping with the original intent of tax increment 
financing to redevelop poorer neighborhoods and combat urban decay. To 
address specificity concerns in large-scale TIFs, yet still maintain an incentive 
to redevelop in truly blighted urban areas, this note advocates a two-step 
implementation process for TIFs that meet the heightened definition of blight 
in a larger redevelopment area. This would allow greater flexibility for large-
scale developers to develop on a more realistic, project-by-project basis, yet 
still maintain specificity and accountability for each project within the overall 
TIF plan. “Clawback provisions” allow taxpayers to recoup the value of local 
tax incentives from developers if developer obligations are not met. It is 
proposed that these provisions be incorporated into the Missouri TIF statute. 
The other “tier” is more typical of TIFs across the state.210 A majority of 
TIFs are for project-specific retail development, and, particularly in St. Louis, 
 
 208. EAST-WEST GATEWAY REP., supra note 157, at 36. Note that the city of St. Louis “has 
required a ‘clawback’ provision in its redevelopment agreements since 2005.” It is not, however, 
required by statute. This note proposes that a clawback provision be added to the statewide TIF 
statute. 
 209. See KELSAY, supra note 34, at 27–28. 
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TIFs are used “by suburban areas with little need for assistance.”211 This note 
advocates eliminating the statutory “blight” test for this type of TIF, and 
replacing it with tests that measure the TIF’s effectiveness in generating 
economic development that benefits the region. In this way, the statutory test 
reflects the nature and purpose of this type of TIF. 
CONCLUSION 
The NorthSide cases raise several important issues in Missouri TIF law. 
Most obviously, how much specificity is required to meet the statutory 
requirements of a TIF project in Missouri? Yet other questions are also 
implied: How important is blight in determining the validity of TIF? How can 
laws be constructed to incentivize large-scale urban redevelopment, yet still 
assure developer accountability? The NorthSide TIF stands in sharp contrast in 
nature and scope to the more typical TIFs in Missouri involving targeted retail 
development. This note seeks to find a reasonable path of reform. It seeks a 
balanced approach by tightening standards in certain areas, eliminating 
meaningless standards in other areas, and providing flexibility in still other 
areas. 
Tax increment financing is a powerful tool for both redevelopment and 
development. It has the power to reclaim whole neighborhoods that are truly 
blighted and also to facilitate many smaller development projects that stimulate 
economic growth. TIF involves many billions of dollars in Missouri taxes, and, 
furthermore, it has impact on school districts, communities, and businesses 
large and small. It is essential that the nature of tax increment financing law 
reflect the nature of the development itself in order to optimize the benefits of 
TIF and to minimize its abuse. 
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